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Keywords
due to both budgetary constraints on the public sector and to the need to 
optimize financial resources, several models and methods of public-private 
partnerships (ppps) in megaprojects have been developed in the current 
financial crisis, although there is considerable confusion and ambiguit y 
as to how these models should be systematized. This article provides a 
literature review of PPP Models, where the clarification of this current 
confusion and ambiguity constitute the fundamental issue addressed 
by our research. The systematization of the PPP models is performed by 
applying six classification criteria based on organizational and financial 
aspects and focused on the Spanish experience. Additionally, a com-
parative study of the various schemes applied in European countries is 
carried out, whereby the concession model implemented successfully 
in Spain is studied in greater detail. To this end, a megaproject, the first 
metro line of Seville (Spain) forms the basis of a case-study. When the 
megaproject is viable through user fees, the public sector can use PPPs 
to defer payments and as a way to control their deficits and debt without 
cutting investments in infrastructures and public services. Nevertheless, 
certain drawbacks should be borne in mind, such as the expenditure 
commitments of future budgets, the higher cost of private funding, and 
the necessity for transparency and accountability of PPP contractual 
arrangements to be improved. Therefore, the aim of this article is to 
analyze the various forms of PPPs in megaprojects in order to determine 
the potential efficiency gains that can be achieved in the implementa-





The public-private participation in 
megaprojects has recently become the 
focus of great interest, despite the long 
tradition in EU countries of private sec-
tor involvement in public megaprojects. 
Due to both budgetary constraints on 
the public sector and to the need to op-
timize financial resources, especially in 
the current credit crunch, several mod-
els and methods of public-private part-
nership (PPP) have been developed.
PPPs models are an interesting al-
ternative to be considered among oth-
ers, which may be useful in attracting 
private capital to finance megaprojects, 
whilst introducing market criteria in 
their construction and operation. When 
PPP models are used, the public works 
are finally paid by the government (and, 
therefore by taxpayers). In general, all 
PPPs are more expensive than tradi-
tional debt operations (KPMG, 2009). 
Nevertheless, governments must con-
tinue investing in megaprojects (road 
infrastructures, underground trans-
port, hospitals, etc.), and therefore, 
the first issue to be confirmed must 
be whether the megaproject is work-
able from a traditional budgetary point 
of view. If this first option is unfeasi-
ble, then alternative models should be 
analysed.
The current literature features a 
number of classifications of models of 
Public-Private Partnerships, although 
there is a considerable confusion 
around the notion of PPP and also am-
biguity as to how the various models 
should be systematized (for example, 
see Saussier, 2012; Hodge et al., 2010; 
Ruuska and Teigland, 2009). Under-
standing and enhancing knowledge of 
PPPs continue to be a matter of sig-
nificance and importance (Kwak et al., 
2009). Practical problems in implemen-
tation appear due to the lack of knowl-
edge and non-systematic approach in 
the research of PPPs (Milosavljevic and 
Benkovic, 2009). There is, therefore, a 
need for clear definitions and under-
standing of the concept of PPPs.
Due to the complex nature of PPPs, 
the literature covers a wide range of dis-
ciplines, including construction and proj-
ect management, public policy and public 
administration, and project finance. Our 
research provides a literature review fo-
cused within the organizational and fi-
nancial aspects of PPPs, where the clar-
ification of this current confusion and 
ambiguity constitute the fundamental 
issue addressed by our research.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, 
no general comparison of models of PPPs 
is currently in existence. Therefore, our 
goals become the systematization and 
analysis of the different models of public-
private partnerships by using organiza-
tional and financial criteria and focused 
on the Spanish experience. This research 
contributes towards the PPP literature by: 
(1) clarifying the PPP concept, (2) identify-
ing the main features of PPPs, and (3) de-
veloping a conceptual framework for as-
sessment of the efficiency of PPP projects.
The literature review offers various 
criteria for the classification of these part-
nerships, generally depending on the 
scheme of the division of responsibilities 
between the public and private functions 
of design, construction, financing, man-
agement, and payments of the megapro-
ject. In our work, six classification criteria 
based on organizational and financial 
aspects and focused on the Spanish ex-
perience have been chosen:
1. The degree  of responsibility as-
sumed by the public sector in financ-
ing the megaproject. 
2. The sources of financing and the lev-
els of risk-taking in the public-private 
partnership.
3. The system of payments  from the 
public to the private sector when 
the private sector is financing the 
megaproject.
4. The budgetary impact of private fi-
nancing in public megaprojects.
5. The form of public intervention.
6. The degree of private sector involve-
ment in the functions of design, con-
struction, financing, management, 
and payments in the megaproject. 
These criteria serve as a reference 
when designing strategies for public-
private partnerships. The levels of so-
phistication within the PPP markets 
in each country are nonetheless at 
very different stages of development, 
thereby rendering international eval-
uations problematic. The public sec-
tor should absorb the lessons learned 
from the countries that pioneered PPPs 
and should combine this insight with 
proficient financial and legal exper-
tise in order to create innovative and 
bespoke solutions for complex infra-
structural megaprojects.
A comparative analysis between the 
various schemes applied in the Euro-
pean countries is then performed, 
whereby the concession model imple-
mented successfully in Spain and ex-
ported to other countries is studied in 
greater detail (Vasallo and Izquierdo, 
2007). The implementation of a new 
PPP model in the construction and ex-
ploitation of new metro lines in Spain 
is analyzed as a case study.
The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 presents the 
methodological approach and Section 
3 the literature review. The definition 
and main characteristics of PPPs in the 
current context are analyzed in Sec-
tion 4. Different classification criteria 
of PPP models are included in Section 
5. A comparative analysis between the 
various schemes applied in the Euro-
pean countries is performed in Section 
6 whilst an innovative Spanish model 
is presented in Section 7. Conclusions 
are drawn in Section 8.
Methodological Approach
To perform our research, we have con-
ducted a thorough analysis of the sci-
entific and professional literature. Our 
research is not just a descriptive list 
of the material available, nor is it sim-
ply a set of summaries. In this litera-
ture review, our purpose is to convey 
what knowledge and ideas have been 
established on the PPP topic, paying 
special attention to the organizational 
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and financial aspects, and to inform 
stakeholders about their strengths and 
weaknesses thanks to the criteria ana-
lyzed which serve as a reference when 
designing strategies for PPPs.
A single case-study approach (Yin, 
2003) has been then adopted to facili-
tate an understanding of the concept 
of PPP and to capture detailed quali-
tative and quantitative data. A mega-
project, the first metro line of Seville 
(Spain), which forms the basis of this 
case-study, was inaugurated in 2009, 
the Concession Agreement having been 
signed in June, 2003. 
During this time, the following 
data-collection activities have been 
undertaken:
 X Site visits and observations. 
 X Document and archive analysis was 
undertaken of minutes of meetings, 
status reports, and process flow 
diagrams.
 X Interviews, which were conducted 
with project participants, the finan-
cial manager of the Society Metro 
de Sevilla, and stakeholders (literal 
transcriptions of the interviews can 
be found in Irimia and Oliver, 2010). 
The analysis of the data was con-
ducted inductively rather than taking 
a prior theory into consideration. This 
means that key themes such as dynam-
ics of relationships, and organizational 
and financial issues emerged from the 
analysis of the data. 
Literature review 
Despite the fact that empirical studies 
have been flourishing recently in an 
effort to analyze particular aspects of 
PPPs (such as bidding processes, con-
tractual choices, and renegotiations), 
PPPs have yet to be extensively studied 
from a theoretical point of view. Accord-
ing to Saussier (2012) a theory of pub-
lic–private agreements is needed and 
still to be constructed; little has been 
done to focus on specific aspects of 
those arrangements, with respect to 
their differences with private–private 
agreements. Theoretical adjustments 
are probably necessary in order to pro-
vide for the specificities of public–pri-
vate agreements and to enhance our 
understanding of their efficiency and/
or inefficiency in certain contexts. 
Shaoul et al. (2012) stress the 
need for information to be accessible 
to the public, and in particular argue 
that a stream of information between 
the partners in the public and private 
sector needs to be developed and dis-
seminated to achieve accountability for 
public money that is increasingly spent 
in the private sector. Benito and Mon-
tesinos (2009) analyze some propos-
als for the private financing of public 
works that have emerged in Spain in 
recent years and show that all the new 
financing methods assessed are incor-
rectly labelled as “private”, since the 
payments are ultimately made by the 
Government by means of its budgetary 
resources. Allard and Trabant (2008) 
state that Spain presents an interest-
ing paradox in the history of PPP. While 
it is one of Europe´s oldest, most active 
and most enthusiastic users of PPPs, it 
is at the same time one of the countries 
that has demonstrated the least interest 
at an official level in informing, monitor-
ing, regulating and following up projects 
to ensure that their principal benefits are 
being achieved.
An in-depth literature review on PPP-
related research over the last 20 years 
was performed by Kwak et al. (2009). 
The aim of the article is to facilitate a 
comprehensive understanding of PPPs 
through the discussion of the defini-
tions, types, examples of worldwide 
applications, benefits, and obstacles 
of PPPs. Types of PPPs vary in terms of 
the degree of private involvement (our 
sixth criterion of classification) although 
only PPPs where the private sector also 
needs to contribute financially to the 
project, such as BOT (Build, Operate and 
Transfer) and PFI (Private Finance Initia-
tive), lie within the focus of the article.
An interesting classification frame-
work of PPP research is described by 
defining the following critical success 
factors and barriers for PPP projects:
1. Government Roles and Responsibili-
ties, whereby the roles of the gov-
ernment in facilitating PPP projects 
are clarified.
2. Concessionaire Selection Methods 
and Criteria which are classified into 
four packages: financial; technical; 
safety, health, and environmental; 
and managerial. 
3. Risk Identification and Allocation 
Strategies.
4. Financing Technique, Instruments, 
and Strategies.
Hodge and Greve (2007) state that 
there is still much confusion around 
notions of partnership, what can be 
learned about from our history with 
partnerships, and what is new about 
the partnership forms that are in vogue 
today. These authors argue that evalu-
ations thus far point to contradictory 
results regarding their effectiveness 
and value-for-money. A typology of 
PPPs based on financial and organi-
zational relationships is firs analyzed. 
One broad alternative view of PPPs is as 
a language game designed to “cloud” 
other strategies and purposes. They 
go on analyzing this option, with other 
authors, in latter publications such as 
Hodge et al. (2010), where the differ-
ent interest of multiple stakeholders 
and the cross-disciplinarity of PPPs is 
also analyzed.
Conceptually, there are five differ-
ent types of possible PPPs (Hodge et 
al, 2010):
1. Institutional cooperation for joint 
production and risk sharing (such 
as the Netherlands Port Authority).
2.  Long-term infrastructure contracts 
(LTICs) that emphasize tight specifi-
cation of outputs in long-term legal 
contracts, as exemplified in UK PFI 
projects.
3.  Public policy networks, in which 
loose stakeholder relationships are 
emphasized.
4.  Civil society and community de-
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velopment, in which partnership 
symbolism is adopted for cultural 
change.
5.  Urban renewal and downtown eco-
nomic development
Some alternatives to the PPP mod-
els can also be considered. Accord-
ing to Yescombe, (2007), these are the 
main alternatives that may be of worth 
consideration:
 X Public-sector procurement, which 
may be adapted to achieve the main 
beneﬁts of a PPP structure, without 
some of the drawbacks of cost and 
inﬂexibility. However, this will prob-
ably involve funding wholly provided 
by (or at the risk of) the public sector, 
with the budgetary disadvantages 
included.
 X  Post-construction take-out. As the 
highest-risk phase for a PPP is usu-
ally during construction, a post-con-
struction take-out (or assumption of 
risk) by the Public Authority cuts out 
the ‘higher’ cost of private-sector 
funding thereafter in return for tak-
ing operation-phase risks. This also 
at least allows the Facility to be kept 
off the public-sector balance sheet 
during the construction phase.
Public-sector debt funding. 
Using public-sector funding for the Proj-
ect company’s debt may be proposed 
as a way of reducing its capital-cost 
disadvantages, while leaving the rest 
of the standard PPP structure in place. 
 X Joint-Venture PPPs. In a Joint-Venture 
PPP the Public Authority becomes an 
equity shareholder, and, therefor the 
public sector shares in equity returns 
and any funding windfalls. This op-
tion will be developed in Section 6.
 X Not-for-proﬁt structures. Another ap-
proach to reducing the cost of capital 
for PPP projects is to eliminate the 
equity return which goes to the pri-
vate sector, or retain it for the beneﬁt 
of the public sector. Paradoxically, 
however, this may result in higher 
initial service fees.
Steijn et al. (2011) study the assump-
tion that a higher degree of PPP leads 
to more and better outcomes because 
public and private actors combine their 
knowledge and resources. They analyze 
whether the intensity and type of mana-
gerial strategies are more important 
than other factors for the outcomes. 
On one hand, they find partnerships 
that are characterized by either tight 
organizational forms or loosely coupled 
forms, and partnerships that are char-
acterized by either a principle agent re-
lationship between public and private 
actors or by a more equal relationship; 
the UK PFI is an example of a PPP with a 
principle agent relation and strong con-
tractual ties. On the other hand, they 
also find joint consortia established 
by the partners together (tight form of 
principle-principle relation) and more 
network like partnerships (principle-
principle relations and more loosely 
coupled organizational form). Based 
on a large survey of individuals involved 
in Dutch environmental projects, Steijn 
et al. show that although the degree 
of PPP correlates positively with the 
outcomes of projects, this correlation 
disappears when the number of mana-
gerial strategies employed is included 
in the analysis. Therefore, greater at-
tention should be paid to the manage-
rial efforts necessary to develop and 
implement PPPs. 
Not only do Ruuska and Teigland 
(2009) clearly demand more in-depth 
studies which compare types of PPPs, 
but they also indicate the need for re-
search which focuses on the comparison 
of PPPs across other dimensions. Never-
theless, they only looked in-depth at one 
specific type of public–private partner-
ship, a project in e-government in Swe-
den that involved 16 organizations from 
academia, government, and industry to 
develop an innovative internet portal for 
the private construction industry. Beck 
et al. (2009) conducted an exploratory, 
qualitative single-case study of the Ger-
man Toll Collect case to analyze how this 
IT-PPP megaproject which had been on 
the verge of failure finally succeeded. 
They suggest that the deployment of 
boundary spanning activities and their 
specific antecedent conditions, moder-
ated by external stakeholder support of 
a public-private environment, affects the 
formation of mutual trust and therefore 
the success of an IT megaproject in the 
context of PPPs.
Marrewijk et al. (2008) compare the 
project designs, daily practices, project 
cultures and management approaches 
of two megaprojects in the Netherlands 
and Australia, and show how these proj-
ects made sense of uncertainty, ambi-
guity and risk. The case studies suggest 
that managerial rationalities are limited 
in understanding their own complex 
project realities which are themselves 
bound by limits imposed by overall gov-
ernance structures and strategies.
In addition to the clarification of the 
concept of PPP and the analysis of the 
main types of PPPs, another main issue 
studied is the evaluation of the perfor-
mance of the different models. In this 
sense, Koontz and Thomas (2012) ana-
lyze how to measure the performance of 
these arrangements. Performance mea-
sures based on traditional governmen-
tal forms, such as centralized planning 
and regulation, are relatively straight-
forward. In collaborative governance, 
however, the wide range of policy tools 
for enabling and encouraging public-
private partnerships (such as grants, 
contracts, and technical assistance), re-
quires more nuance in distinguishing 
outputs from outcomes. These authors 
present a classification system for de-
fining outputs and outcomes for various 
types of programs.
Definition of Public-Private 
Partnership 
Contractually, megaprojects are often 
defined in terms of Public Private Part-
nerships (PPP), in which there is a struc-
tural cooperation between public and 
private parties to deliver some agreed 
outcome. PPP is a concept that involves 
working with public and private coop-
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eration and partnerships to deliver in-
frastructure and services to the popu-
lation. It is an alternative structure that 
intermediates between state ownership 
on the one hand and, full privatization 
on the other.
The term PPP was coined in the 
United Kingdom in 1992, following the 
abolition in 1989 of the legislation that 
had previously restricted the use of pri-
vate capital for the financing of public 
assets. Nevertheless, Spain was not a 
newcomer to PPP when megaprojects 
began to spread at the end of the 1990s; 
a simple form of PPP (a BOT model) was 
successfully performed in the 1970s to 
construct numerous toll highways. It 
appeared natural for Spain to explore 
the PPP option under the conservative 
government in 1996, who focused on de-
regulating and privatizing the economy 
(Allard and Trabant, 2008). 
The scheme was created due to a 
shortage of financial resources, and to 
the subsequent decrease in investment 
by the government. The public sector 
when accepting the participation of the 
private sector, establishes a partner-
ship in order to manage an asset or busi-
ness which provides a public service.
In a PPP, the public sector is respon-
sible for the establishment of the in-
vestment priorities, scope and stan-
dards required for public services and 
the identification of community needs. 
The private sector must find the most 
cost-effective combination required by 
such services and/or public infrastruc-
ture, in terms of the design, construc-
tion, operation and maintenance, work 
practices and financial capital.
The main justification for PPPs is the 
possibility to exploit the management 
expertise and the efficiency of the pri-
vate sector without giving up quality 
standards, thanks to appropriate con-
trol mechanisms from the public sector. 
Although a PPP leads major advantages, 
it may involve an additional financial 
cost and, in the absence of adequate 
controls, it can also damage the quality 
of public services. 
It might be expected that the de-
mand for PPPs from governments would 
increase in response to the recession, 
since these partnerships represent a 
way of building infrastructure whilst 
limiting the effect on the official gov-
ernment deficit. In this crisis context, 
one of the main reasons for the creation 
of a PPP is to prevent any such impact of 
megaprojects on the government defi-
cit, or, at least, to defer or minimize 
such impact.
The recession also provides private 
companies with even greater incentives 
to sign PPP contracts: they receive long-
term business from the government at 
a time when demand from the private 
sector is falling. However, the credit cri-
sis means that banks and investors are 
much more reluctant to lend to private 
companies at all. Several authors such as 
Hall (2009) state that as a result, compa-
nies are largely unable to borrow money 
to finance PPPs. 
From a budgetary perspective, one 
major issue concerns the way in which 
megaproject concessions have an im-
pact on the budget deficit. Obviously, the 
annual payment of the fee is considered 
an expense and is computed annually in 
the budget. With respect to investments 
linked to a megaproject, Eurostat recom-
mends that the following conditions must 
be observed so that the deficit remains 
out of the scope of the government´s re-
sponsibility: (a) the private sector bears 
the risks of construction and, (b) the pri-
vate sector also bears the risks involved 
in availability and/or risks in demand. 
Benito and Montesinos (2009) conclude 
that many countries have used PPPs to 
defer payment and this way control their 
deficits and debt without cutting invest-
ments in infrastructures and public ser-
vices, but payments are finally made by 
the Governments.
Searching for new models of PPPs 
requires lots of imagination. On the one 
hand, a high quality in public services 
must be obtained, and on the other 
hand, a rigid budgetary discipline has 
to be achieved.
Types of models of public-
private partnerships in 
Megaprojects
The current literature features a number 
of classifications of PPPs, although there 
is a considerable confusion and am-
biguity as to how the various models 
should be systematized, as mentioned 
previously.
In our work, the criteria for the classi-
fication of these partnerships have been 
selected depending on the scheme of 
division of responsibilities between the 
public and private functions for financ-
ing, management,  and payments of 
the megaproject and based in the Span-
ish experience.  These six classification 
criteria are shown in Figure 1.
The classification criteria are:
1. The degree of responsibility assumed 
by the public sector in financing the 
megaproject. The involvement of the 
public sector in financing the mega-
project, according to the responsibil-
ity assumed by the relevant Admin-
istration and the degree of private 
sector participation, can take place 
through any of seven different mod-
els (Sardá, 2005):
 X Public Model: all functions are as-
sumed by the public sector, for ex-
ample in the case of the free use of 
roads. 
 X Public Model with Private Payment: 
all functions are assumed by the pub-
lic sector, except the payment, for 
example in the case of the Spanish 
railway system. 
 X Public Model with Private Manage-
ment: the private sector is responsi-
ble for the management, while other 
functions are performed by the rel-
evant government administration. 
This model is designed to take ad-
vantage of potential efficiency im-
provements that can arise from man-
agement by the private sector. This 
model has been applied in some hos-
pitals in Spain.
 X Private Model: a private enterprise as-
sumes all the responsibilities. It is dif-
ficult to find a pure private model, but 
609
a good approximation can be found in 
toll road concessions. 
 X Private Model with Public Payment: all 
the responsibilities are for a private 
enterprise, except the payment, which 
will be provided by the public sector. 
A clear example of the application of 
this model is found in motorway con-
cessions with the system of “shadow 
tolls”, which are later discussed in 
greater detail. 
 X Privatized Public Model: this cor-
responds to services that the state 
has built and funded, but remains 
managed by the private sector, and 
payment is provided by the user. Nu-
merous examples can be observed in 
privatizations carried out in Argentina. 
 X Private Socialized Model: this applies 
to infrastructure constructed and fi-
nanced by the private sector, which 
is rented to the public sector for man-
agement and payment. This model 
has been applied in power plants.
2. By taking into account the source of 
funding and the assumption of risks, 
we can identify possible types of pri-
vate collaboration with public mega-
projects (Irimia and Oliver, 2010):
 X The public sector seeks private fund-
ing for its projects, but assumes the 
risk of providing the service. The pri-
vate sector is just a source of external 
finance. In this case, there is no incen-
tive for the private sector to improve 
the allocation of public investment 
since it assumes no risk, and there-
fore requires no conditions.
 X The private sector provides financing 
and shares risk. 
 X The private sector fully assumes the 
risks but follows the guidelines dic-
tated by the public sector. In these 
cases there may be problems in obtain-
ing all the necessary financing and/or 
guarantees, given the scale of these 
projects, hence the scarcity of projects 
that follow this type of collaboration.
3. The system of payments from public 
to private sector generates the fol-
lowing formulas:
 X Traditional system. The traditional 
system consists of paying the builder 
with payments on account (labour 
certification) as a closed budget and 
approved by the Administration, sub-
ject to price revisions when derived.
 X The German method. Also known 
as  total price payment or key on 
hand method. In this case, the Ad-
ministration signs a contract with 
the successful private company ten-
dered for building and financing the 
project, whereby the building costs 
Degree of responsibility assumed 
by the public sector in financing the 
megaproject
Budgetary impact
 X Public Model
 X Public Model with Private Payment
 X Public Model with Private 
Management
 X Private Model
 X Private Model with Public Payment
 X Privatized Public Model
 X Private Socialized Model
 X Private Models
 X Models with budgetary 
implications
 X Models of no budget impact
 X Mixed Models
Sources of financing and levels of 
risk-taking 
Form in which the public sector 
interevene in the different phases of 
the megaproject sources of financing 
and levels of risk-taking
 X Public sector seeks private funding, 
but assumes the risk of the 
megaproject
 X Private sector provides financing 
and shares risk
 X Private sector fully assumes the 
risks but follows the guidelines 
dictated by the public sector 
 X Direct intervention of the 
government
 X Idirect intervention through the 
creation of public entities
The system of payments from public to 
private sector
Degree of involvement by the private 
sector in the various functions
 X Traditional system 
 X German method 
 X Shadow toll
 X BO Model
 X BOT Model
 X BTO Model
 X BBO Model
 X DFBO Model
 X LDO Model
 X WAA Model
Figure 1 Types of models of public-private partnership in Megaprojects
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and interests are reimbursed after 
the full completion of the work. No 
partial payment account is therefore 
required. The contractor is obliged, 
consequently, to finance the construc-
tion, advancing the quantities needed 
until there is receipt of the completed 
work. This formula has been widely 
used in Germany (hence the name) for 
highway construction (Vasallo and Iz-
quierdo, 2007). Once the public mega-
project is up and running, then the Ad-
ministration may choose to pay either 
the full agreed price in a lump sum 
or in up to ten annual instalments; 
thereby allowing the possibility for 
the contractor to convert these future 
payments into tolls to be paid by the 
megaproject users. The main reason 
given for the use of this funding model 
is that it defers the entry of this invest-
ment into the government accounts 
to a date after the execution of the 
work, whilst simultaneously, defer-
ring any public debt arising from the 
operation. This German method has 
been used by the Spanish Central Ad-
ministration (Irimia and Oliver, 2010). 
According to Benito and Montesinos 
(2009), the current EU accounting 
standard (ESA 95) establish that in-
vestment expenses must be reported 
along the years of construction (ac-
crual accounting), whilst the previous 
approach under ESA 70 reported the 
expenses according to the payments 
made (cash accounting). The result of 
taking into account these accounting 
rules is the suspension of the use of 
this financing method according to 
additional dispositions of the laws 
passing the State General Budgets 
in Spain.
 X The shadow toll; the infrastructure 
is built and operated by the conces-
sionaire. The public administration 
just pays to the private agent the cor-
responding rates in order to get ser-
vices provided by using the assets 
constructed. The payment is made 
by means of periodic amounts of 
money which depends upon the use 
of the infrastructure by the citizens 
(Benito and Montesinos, 2003). The 
concessionaire does not assume the 
risk that the infrastructure is unde-
rutilized, since the Administration 
will ensure a level of income with 
which to achieve financial balance. 
According to Vasallo and Izquierdo 
(2007), the difference of this kind of 
contracts and pure concessions is 
that is the government who pays the 
rates, not the users. It is easy to see 
that the economic and financial back-
ground model based on the “shadow 
toll” is practically the same as what 
is known as “operating lease”. Some-
times, the megaproject´s ownership 
is transferred to the public sector at 
the end of the operating period, and 
then it is closer to a finance lease. 
This model implies, as conceived in 
countries like France and Germany, 
the approval by the Public Adminis-
tration of the temporary occupation of 
a public domain by the leasing com-
pany that both builds and finances the 
work. This model is currently in use 
in various countries. Thus, in Britain, 
the Roads Act of 1991 articulated a 
new system of toll road construction 
by the private sector, through a con-
tractual relationship with the state, 
which reflects the principle that each 
project should be financed with user 
tolls without warranty or support from 
the state, whereby the developer or 
contractor runs all the risks in the con-
struction and operation. Since road 
users in Britain are not accustomed 
to paying tolls, the public sector is 
expected to pay the road runs for the 
first years (hence the famous name 
of shadow toll). However, it is antici-
pated that the British state can also 
assist in the financing of these infra-
structures through operating sub-
sidies, earmarked taxes, exchange 
guarantees, refunding advances, sub-
sidized credits, tax exemptions, etc.
The shadow toll method has been 
used in Spain as a licence system where 
private sector is engaged to build and 
maintain the infrastructure, and the 
public sector pays a toll for its use, un-
til the settlement of financial commit-
ments. When the concession term is 
over, the megaproject becomes a public 
ownership, without additional cost for 
the public sector. 
4.  According to the budgetary impact 
of the private financing of the public 
megaproject, the following models are 
allocated (Irimia and Oliver, 2010):
 X Private Models. If a project is to be 
funded entirely by the private sector 
and there is no financial link with the 
public sector, then generally the only 
role of government is to grant permis-
sion for the construction and opera-
tion and to exercise supervisory and 
control functions. Once the project is 
approved, the private provider can ob-
tain the necessary funds, which can 
probably be achieved in one or more 
of the following ways: capital, credit, 
and/or bonds. The financial structure 
of the megaproject is likely to be af-
fected by the conditions of the conces-
sion and the guarantees attached to 
the funds. As regards the conditions 
of the concession, in some cases the 
only security available to the provider 
of funding is the stream of revenue 
from the operation of the facility, al-
though public commitments are some-
times incurred. The first phase of the 
megaproject usually requires a high 
proportion of financing through capi-
tal, thereby starting the project with a 
low leverage ratio unless the debt may 
be guaranteed by parent companies or 
other guarantors, usually in the form of 
the issue of bonds during the construc-
tion phase. Once the infrastructure is 
in place, these bonds can be used to 
refinance existing loans. Due to these 
circumstances, the cases of totally pri-
vate financing are rare. There is often 
some type of public sector involve-
ment, either through capital injec-
tions, debt underwriting, and guaran-
teeing the debt, or through guarantee-
ing a certain level of income stream.
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 X Models with budgetary implica-
tions. It is first necessary to clarify 
that private financing of public infra-
structure does not necessarily mean 
privatization. However, if the State 
agrees to reimburse the amount of 
financing in full, then this has an im-
pact on the public budget and the 
problems of public deficits may per-
sist. In these cases, the state contin-
ues to bear all the risk and, therefore, 
private funding does not implement 
stricter criteria for viability.
 X Models of no budget impact. In this 
type, those partnerships in which 
there is a mix between public ad-
ministration and private payment are 
included. In other words, the cost of 
the megaproject is supported by the 
users and not by taxpayers in gen-
eral. Two examples in Spain are the 
Public Corporations (Airport Com-
pany, AENA, and the Port Authority) 
and the State Highway Societies. In 
the former, investments are funded 
through fees paid by users, while 
the latter is paid for through the 
collection of tolls set by the private 
company.
 X Mixed Models. This group may in-
clude all those formulas in which 
the executor of the infrastructure is 
paid by a combination of public and 
private resources. For example, in 
the case of the Spanish State Water 
Corporation, there is a combination 
of public and private resources that 
are articulated in the agreements 
signed with these companies and 
individuals for the realization of hy-
draulic works.
5. The form in which the public sector 
intervenes in the different phases of 
the megaprojects, leads us to distin-
guish between:
 X Direct intervention of the government.
 X Indirect intervention through the cre-
ation of public companies and public 
entities.
It is worth going into greater depth in 
the latter model: the creation of public 
companies and public entities. As stated 
in Gutierrez de Vera (2004), it is neces-
sary to differentiate between the effect 
of investments made by public compa-
nies that develop a real business, with 
income generation, such as RENFE or 
AENA, whose spending on investment 
is not consolidated with public spend-
ing, from those purely instrumental com-
panies, which obtained the necessary 
funds (in the form of debt) by accessing 
certain commitments by the Public Entity 
creator and main shareholder. Regard-
less of the operative efficiency of the new 
public entity, the debt included in its bal-
ance sheet which will be paid off by the 
public sector, will be computed as pub-
lic deficit. Furthermore, the investment 
will be entered as an expense, thereby 
increasing the public debt in the year it 
is performed. Nevertheless, certain com-
binations of these public entities, as it 
will be explained later, can be used in 
order to avoid the consolidation of the 
debt in the public budget.
6. The degree of the private sector in-
volvement in terms of design, con-
struction, financing, management and 
payment infrastructure is determined 
both by a single model called conces-
sion, and by several variants which 
can take place. The concession model 
has traditionally been the PPP formula 
most commonly used in Spain. Not-
withstanding, it should be borne in 
mind, as mentioned above, that it is 
not a single model, since under the 
concession formula a variety of types 
with different characteristics can be 
implemented. The existing arrange-
ments are:
 X BO Model (Build and Operate): it is a 
model granted in perpetuity, where 
a private entity finances, builds and 
manages without any time limit, 
where the Administration assumes 
the task of control.
 X BOT Model (Build, Operate and Trans-
fer): in this case, the concession has a 
limited time within which the private 
sector builds and manages. During 
the period of the infrastructure man-
agement by the private enterprise, 
the investment is recovered and the 
expected return is obtained. At the 
end of the concession, the owner-
ship of the project becomes public.
 X BTO Model (Build, Transfer and Oper-
ate): the project ownership becomes 
public before its operation. When the 
construction phase is completed, the 
private sector leases the project to 
the public sector. This system is rec-
ommended when the responsibilities 
and risks of the project lie beyond the 
building stage.
 X BBO Model (Buy, Build and Operate): 
this system involves a private com-
pany which purchases certain public 
infrastructure for its management, af-
ter the completion of repairs and/or 
extension thereof. This formula is suit-
able for the development of infrastruc-
tures that are damaged or congested.
 X DFBO Model (Design, Finance, Build 
and Operate), under which the con-
cessionaire, usually privately, de-
signs, builds, finances and manages 
the infrastructure. The Administra-
tion pays for the provision of ser-
vices arising from public works built 
by the shadow toll system, as dis-
cussed above. Such contracts are, in 
short, almost identical to pure con-
cession models, with the only differ-
ence being that it is the Administra-
tion who pays and not the users, and 
hence, this method of financing may 
be treated as an operating lease. In 
some cases, it is possible that the 
infrastructure reverts to the Admin-
istration at the end of the operation 
period, in which case it more closely 
resembles a finance lease.
 X LDO Model (Lease, Develop and Op-
erate): in this case, a company leases 
certain assets to the government, 
and manages the repair during the 
term of the concession.
 X WAA Model (Wraparound Addition): 
where the private entity extends pub-
licly owned and operated infrastruc-
ture. Such management may corre-
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spond to the entire infrastructure or 
only to the extended part. When the 
operation is complete, the ownership 
is shared, since the extension be-
longs only to the private enterprise.
A comparative analysis 
between the various schemes 
applied in the European 
countries
The PPP formula first emerged in the 
United Kingdom in the wake of the 
conservative revolution of Margaret 
Thatcher. Beginning in the early 1990s, 
the PFI (Private Financing Initiative), as 
it was called in the UK, spread quickly 
across sectors and took various forms, 
depending on the exact role that each 
project assigned to the private and 
public sectors. Through its PFI, the UK 
government makes use of partnership 
models to develop and deliver all man-
ner of infrastructure, from schools to 
defense facilities. PFI projects now rep-
resent between 10 and 13 percent of all 
UK investment in public infrastructure 
(Deloitte, 2006). The United Kingdom 
has pioneered the trend; their use has 
spread from the United Kingdom to Eu-
rope. The European Commission (see for 
example, Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009) has over many 
years promoted Public-Private partici-
pation schemes. 
Spain had experience in PPP when 
projects involving cooperation between 
the public and private sectors began to 
spread in size and variety at the end of 
the 1990s. The concession model used 
successfully in Spain and Latin America 
and even exported to the United States, 
is proof of its success. Public participa-
tion schemes mixed with private funding 
formulas can also be found in Spain, in 
which the government provides financial 
support for socially beneficial projects 
that fail to achieve the financial break-
even point.
According to IFSL (2012), 44 PPP deals 
in the UK in 2010 was the highest number 
in the EU, although UK PPP deal value of 
€3.9bn was less than Spain where deals 
reaching financial close totalled €4.3bn. 
Other significant PPP markets included 
Portugal €3.1bn, France €1.8bn and 
Belgium €1.7bn (Figure 2). Since 1990, 
around 1,500 PPP deals in Europe have 
reached financial close with a capital 
value of €282bn. The UK has accounted 
for about half of European PPP activity 
by value.
The importance of Spain as one of 
the most important PPP markets in the 
world is also attested by the presence of 
all Spanish specialized banks and pro-
moters in these processes. The Spanish 
Transport Infrastructure Plan (Programa 
Extraordinario de Infraestrucutras de 
Transporte, PEIT) will invest €17,000 
million until the year 2020 in new and 
improved highways, railways, airports, 
ports and other infraestructures. The 
government plans to obtain 40% of to-
tal financing from the private sector, 
20-30% from public banks (Instituto 
de Crédito Oficial, ICO) and the remain-
ing from the European Investment Bank 
(Díaz, 2011). 
The comparison of PPP experiences 
leads to identify three types of PPP mod-
els: Spanish, Anglo and Auction. These 
schemes differ in the bidding models, 
as shown in Table 1.
The complex nature of the PPP ten-
dering process implies high bid costs 
relative to conventional procurement 
models, which act as an entry barrier 
by discouraging contractor participa-
tion in PPP projects. The UK has one of 
the most elongated and expensive ten-
dering processes for PPP projects. The 
duration of the tendering process varies 
across government departments but is 
on average about 34 months (Adair et 
al., 2011). By contrast the tendering pro-
cess in Spain is much more streamlined 
taking on average between 4-6 months.
The basics of the Spanish model are:
 X Short bidding processes (6 months), 
with requirements of high standards 
of technical and economic soundness 
(but simple documentation).
Figure 2 PPP contracts reaching financial close in Europe by country 
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 X Relatively straightforward contracts 
relying upon the specific legal frame-
work (Law on Concessions of Public 
Works).
 X Simple and reasonably standardized 
contractual framework, without the ri-
gidity required to impose a standard.
 X A balanced sharing of the risk, clearly 
defined in the contract.
 X High importance given to the quality 
of the initial project, not only to the 
levels of compliance in the operation.
 X A relatively high importance is granted 
to the solvency and viability of the of-
fer, not just to the bidder.
The only innovation in the Spanish 
Law was to import the Anglo concept of 
“Value for Money” (hereinafter, VfM). 
This law specifies, in its Article 118, the 
requirement of a comparative analysis 
that justifies the use of this formula in 
terms of obtaining greater value for price. 
VfM is defined, by HM Treasury (2006), 
as the optimum combination of whole-
of-life costs and quality (or fitness for 
purpose) of the good or service to meet 
the user´s requirement. Therefore, VfM 
is not the choice of goods and services 
based on the lowest cost bid; VfM is a 
relative concept which requires compari-
son of the potential or actual outcomes of 
alternative procurement options.
VfM essentially comprises three 
strands; efficiency, risk transfer and 
whole life costs. In order to meet this 
criteria, the most suitable model for the 
execution of the megaproject must be 
chosen, ex-ante and from among vari-
ous alternatives. To this end, all the con-
straints, whatever their nature, are taken 
into account in order to determine which 
alternative offers the lowest possible 
overall cost to the community in general 
and, in particular to the Administration 
responsible. This comparative quantita-
tive analysis requires, for each alterna-
tive, the estimation and disaggregation 
of costs and revenues that may be gener-
ated over the lifetime of the project (HM 
Treasury, 2011).
Concerns persist about the credibility 
of the VfM argument used to support PPP 
projects (Adair et al., 2011). There is an 
information vacuum preventing robust 
quantitative and objective evaluation. The 
absence of credible datasets must be ad-
dressed in order to improve the transpar-
ency and accountability of PPP contrac-
tual arrangements. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) 
contend that the majority of megaprojects 
overrun on costs, fall behind schedule, 
and fail to deliver in the terms used to 
justify the need for the project. They sug-
gest that a main cause of such overruns is 
a lack of realism in initial cost estimates. 
Experience in the UK and other coun-
tries has demonstrated that PPP is not 
appropriate for all projects (Allard and 
Trabant, 2008). Choosing PPP without 
carefully contrasting the public and pri-
vate costs for each project may turn out 
to be a more costly option for taxpayers 
and the final users of the services pro-
vided by a PPP.
Added to this risk is the danger that 
PPP projects that are not carefully moni-
tored may not meet the expected stan-
dards of quality, or may experience cost 
overruns that are charged back to the 
public sector or to the final user. One of 
the main risks in awarding a contract to 
an underpricing bidder is that if the offer 
is too low and the company cannot cover 
costs, it will pressure the government to 
renegotiate the contract at a higher price.
A Review of the Spanish 
Experience of Megaproject PPP
More transparency and effective com-
munication among the different levels 
of the public sector in Spain is required. 
The Spanish public sector is organized 
in three levels: State or Central Admin-
istration, Autonomous Communities or 
Regions (17), and Local Entities The Span-
ish government has yet to make model 
contracts available to its various minis-
tries and levels of government, and no 
Spanish Anglo  Auction
Negotiation of concession 
framework Reduced Intense Medium
Securing funding Not required Indispensable Indispensable
Cost of bidding Medium0.6 to 1 M. €
High
1.5 to 2 M. €
High
1.2 to 1.8 M.€





Degree of objectivity Medium30 to 50% subjective
Medium-High
15 to 30% subjective
High
100% objective
Geographical Location Spain, France and Italy UK, Ireland, Portugal,  Holland, Greece, Germany Canada, USA
Table 1 Bidding models in PPP schemes Source: Irmia and Oliver (2010).
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public-sector comparator has yet been 
developed or adapted that could be 
used to determine whether using the 
PPP formula for a project offers poten-
tial Value for Money. The Spanish gov-
ernment does not maintain an official 
register and details of biddings are not 
always publicly available. Duplicated 
projects should be avoided and the pub-
lic requires more information on the rea-
sons for employing a PPP and its poten-
tial benefits.
One innovative model has been ap-
plied to two Andalusian megaprojects, 
the Seville and Malaga metro lines. 
These megaprojects have involved pub-
lic and private sectors as shareholders 
in a concessionaire company. It is un-
usual to see the Central Government 
sharing risks and management with the 
private sector in a company; neverthe-
less, the participation of the public sec-
tor at different levels (local, regional and 
central) is even less frequent. 
In the case of Seville, the Conces-
sionaire is a Limited Company with an 
initial equity equivalent to 20% of total 
investment. The final investment in in-
frastructure and facilities of the Metro 
Line 1 amounted to 658,020,037 euros. 
The public sector had an initial share-
holding of 25%, and equity loans up to 
5% of the investment could be granted. 
Several private companies such as Iti-
nere, Iridium, CAF were also sharehold-
ers of the Concessionaire. The European 
Investment Bank (E.I.B.) financed up to 
25%, and the remaining amount was 
granted as subsidies from a public com-
pany. After three years of construction 
(and a certain delay), the exploitation 
of the megaproject is finally underway. 
Due to the success of the megaproject, 
the private companies have bought part 
of the shares from the public sector. 
Figure3 shows the main relationships 
among the stakeholders.
According to the six previous criteria 
described in Section 5, this innovative 
model can be classified in the follow-
ing way:
 X It is a Private Model since a private 
enterprise assumes all the respon-
sibilities. The innovation is that the 
public sector is a minority share-
holder of this company.
 X The private sector fully assumes the 
risks, although it follows the guide-
lines dictated by the public sector. 
By taking into account the source of 
funding, there is a mix of public and 
private financing. Due to the high 
level of leverage of the megapro-
ject, various private companies par-
ticipate in the financing of the invest-
ment and the presence of the public 
sector is necessary.
 X By considering the system of pay-
ments, this model is similar to a 
shadow toll where the concessionaire 
assumes the risk of demand. The risk 
of demand consists of the assumption 
of a certain level of use. Therefore, the 
remuneration of the concessionaire is 
based on its initial financial offer and 
the real traffic of users. 
 X It is a Model of no budget impact due 
to the transfer of the risks of demand 
and constructions to the private sec-
tor. The relevance of this fact is that 
the investment is recorded on the 
balance sheet of the private sector. 
Therefore, this megaproject does 
not increase the public deficit (ex-
cept obviously for the amount of in-
vestment subsidized during construc-
tion). For the same reason, the debt 
Figure 3 Relationships among stakeholders in the Concession for Andalusian Metro Lines























produced from financing the invest-
ment is not counted as public debt. 
The payments made by the public 
sector, over the life of the conces-
sion as compensation for the ser-
vice, are linked to the price subsidy. 
Therefore, the short-term effect is 
to reduce the total government ex-
penditure and the budget deficit. 
In the long term, the future stream 
of fees and payments to the private 
partner must also be taken into 
consideration.
 X There is Indirect intervention by the 
public sector; a new public company 
called GIASA (Gestión de Infraestruc-
turas de Andalucía, S.A.) designed 
the bidding process and was one of 
the shareholders of the concession-
aire company.
 X The BOT Model was built by the pri-
vate sector; is now being operated 
by the private sector, and will return 
to the public sector at the end of the 
concession period 35 years. 
Concluding remarks
The classification criteria of PPPs 
shown in the second section enable 
stakeholders to ascertain the most suit-
able model according to their priori-
ties. Which model is best? Each model 
fits into a certain type of megaproject 
in that it obtains the highest Value for 
Money in providing a public service and 
strives to minimize or eliminate the cost 
to the public sector. The public sector 
can use PPPs to defer payments and 
as a way to control their deficits and 
debt without cutting investments in in-
frastructures and public services, al-
though payments are ultimately made 
by the Governments by means of its 
budgetary resources. When the mega-
project is not viable through user fees, 
the contract is usually awarded to the 
company that best minimizes the pres-
ent value of government payments for 
the life of the contract.
Among the advantages of PPP mod-
els, several deserve a special mention: 
(a) the advancement of the use of the 
new infrastructure; (b) the implemen-
tation of deadlines; (c) the control of 
costs; and (d) the greater efficiency at-
tributed to the private sector. 
Nevertheless, certain drawbacks 
should be borne in mind: (a) the ex-
penditure commitments of future bud-
gets, which will limit the financing of 
new projects within a framework of bud-
getary stability; (b) the higher cost of 
private funding compared to traditional 
financing through public debt; and (c) 
the necessity for transparency and ac-
countability of PPP contractual arrange-
ments to be improved.
Thanks to the sophistication in the 
Spanish model, only surpassed by that 
of the UK, countries positioned lower on 
the maturity curve can benefit from a 
deeper understanding of the challenges 
and potential solutions particular to 
each area of infrastructure. 
In our opinion, the keys to success 
of the Spanish model include:
 X The long tradition. There are records 
of privately constructed highways in 
Spain in the 19th century, and for-
mer dictator Francisco Franco suc-
cessfully used a simple form of BOT 
in the 1970s to construct numerous 
toll highways.
 X An ad-hoc legal framework. The 
Spanish Law 30/2007, dated October 
30, of Contracts of the Public Sector 
regulates the wide incorporation of 
PPPs into Spanish legislation.
 X A more efficient process due to the 
short duration of the contract, to 
their lower costs and, to increased 
competition. 
 X The high level of contrast in the ten-
dering process is due to the high 
competition among the private com-
panies that present their offer. 
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